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Summary
We make four main contributions to the theory of network formation. (1) The problem
of network formation with farsighted agents can be formulated as an abstract network
formation game. (2) In any farsighted network formation game the feasible set of
networks contains a unique, finite, disjoint collection of nonempty subsets having the
property that each subset forms a strategic basin of attraction. These basins of attraction
contain all the networks that are likely to emerge and persist if individuals behave
farsightedly in playing the network formation game. (3) A von Neumann Morgenstern
stable set of the farsighted network formation game is constructed by selecting one
network from each basin of attraction. We refer to any such von Neumann-Morgenstern
stable set as a farsighted basis. (4) The core of the farsighted network formation game is
constructed by selecting one network from each basin of attraction containing a single
network. We call this notion of the core, the farsighted core. We conclude that the
farsighted core is nonempty if and only if there exists at least one farsighted basin of
attraction containing a single network. To relate our three equilibrium and stability
notions (basins of attraction, farsighted basis, and farsighted core) to recent work by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we define a notion of pairwise stability similar to the
Jackson-Wolinsky notion and we show that the farsighted core is contained in the set of
pairwise stable networks. Finally, we introduce, via an example, competitive contracting
networks and highlight how the analysis of these networks requires the new features of
our network formation model.
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Finally, we introduce, via an example, competitive contracting networks and
highlight how the analysis of these networks requires the new features of our
network formation model.
1 Introduction
Overview
In many economic and social situations, the totality of interactions between indi-
viduals and coalitions can be modeled as a network. The question we address in this
paper is the following: if individuals are concerned with the long run consequences of
their immediate actions in forming networks with other individuals, that is, if indi-
viduals are farsighted in choosing their network formation strategies, what networks
are likely to emerge and persist? One possible approach to this question is to think
of each possible network representation of individual connections and interactions as
a node in a larger network, called a supernetwork, in which the arcs represent coali-
tional preferences over networks and possible coalitional moves from one network to
another.1 Given the supernetwork representation of agent preferences and the rules
governing network formation, it is then possible to define a farsighted dominance
relation over the networks composing the nodes of the supernetwork and to address
the issue of farsighted equilibrium and stability in network formation. Our first con-
tribution is a model of network formation with farsighted agents as an abstract game
with respect to farsighted dominance.2 In this game, starting from any status quo
network the supernetwork plays the role of a global constraint set (or an eﬀectivity
network), specifying which networks can be formed by coalitions, as well as which
networks are farsightedly preferred by coalitions.
Using the farsighted network formation game induced by the supernetwork as
our basic analytic tool, we make three additional contributions to the theory of net-
work formation. First, we demonstrate that in any farsighted network formation
game the feasible set of networks contains a unique, finite, disjoint collection of non-
empty subsets having the property that each set of networks in the collection forms a
basin of attraction in the farsighted network formation game. These farsighted basins
of attraction contain all the networks that are likely to emerge and persist if indi-
viduals behave farsightedly in choosing their network formation strategies. Second,
we show that by selecting one network from each basin of attraction, we construct
a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set of the farsighted network formation game.
Thus, we show that given any set of rules governing network formation and given
any profile of individual preferences over the feasible set of networks (i.e., given any
supernetwork), the corresponding farsighted network formation game possesses a von
Neumann-Morgenstern stable set of networks. We refer to any such von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set as a farsighted basis of the network formation game and we
1The supernetwork approach to network formation is introduced in Page, Wooders, and Kamat
(2001).
2An abstract game in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953) (also, see Roth (1976))
consists of a pair (D,>) where D is a set of outcomes and > is an ordering defined on D.
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refer to any network contained in a farsighted basis as a farsightedly basic network.
Finally, we show that by selecting one network from each basin of attraction contain-
ing a single network, we construct the core of the farsighted network formation game
- that is, we construct a set of networks having the property that no network in the
set is farsightedly dominated by any other network in the supernetwork. Thus, at
each network in the farsighted core no agent or coalition of agents has an incentive
to alter the given network. We call this notion of the core, the farsighted core. Given
the way in which the farsighted core is constructed, we conclude that the farsighted
core is contained in each farsighted basis of the network formation game and that
the farsighted core is nonempty if and only if there is a farsighted basin of attraction
containing a single network.3
We illustrate our three notions of equilibrium and stability in network formation
games (i.e., basins of attraction, farsighted bases, and the farsighted core) via an
example of strategic competitive contracting. In particular, we introduce a competi-
tive contracting network in which farsighted firms compete to contract with a single,
privately informed agent. Each contracting network in the supernetwork corresponds
to a unique profile of contracting strategies. In our first example, the farsighted
network formation game over contracting networks has one basin of attraction (with
respect to farsighted dominance) consisting of a single contracting network. This
single contracting network constitutes the farsighted core of the network formation
game and thus identifies a unique profile of contracting strategies which is likely
emerge and persist if firms behave farsightedly. In our second example, there is again
one basin of attraction, but this time consisting of multiple contracting networks.
Thus, the farsighted core is empty. However, each contracting network contained in
this single basin of attraction is a farsightedly basic network, and each of these basic
networks taken as a singleton set constitutes a farsighted basis (i.e., a von Neumann-
Morgenstern stable set) of the farsighted network formation game. Taken together
the contracting networks contained in this single basin of attraction identify a set
of contracting strategy profiles each of which is likely to emerge and persist if firms
behave farsightedly.
Directed Networks vs Linking Networks
We focus on directed networks, and in particular, on the extended notion of
directed networks introduced in Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001). In a directed
network, each arc possesses an orientation or direction: arc j connecting nodes i and
i must either go from node i to node i or must go from node i to node i.4 For
example, an individual may have a link on his web page to the web pages of all Nobel
Laureates in economics but no Nobel Laureate may have a link to the individual’s
web page. In an undirected (or linking) network, an arc (or a link) is identified by
a nonempty subset of nodes consisting of exactly two distinct nodes, for example
{i, i}, i 9= i. Thus, in an undirected network, a link has no orientation and would
3Put diﬀerently, the farsighted core is empty if and only if all basins of attraction contain multiple
networks. This equivalency holds because each pair of networks contained in a basin consisting
multiple networks must lie on the same circuit (or cycle) with respect to farsighted dominance.
4We denote arc j going from node i to node i via the ordered pair (j, (i, i)), where (i, i) is also
an ordered pair. Alternatively, if arc j goes from node i to node i, we write (j, (i, i)).
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simply indicate a connection between nodes i and i. Moreover, in an undirected
network links are not distinguished by type - that is, links are homogeneous. Under
our extended definition of a directed network connections between nodes (i.e., arcs),
besides having an orientation, are allowed to be heterogeneous. For example, if the
nodes in a given network represent agents, an arc j going from agent i to agent i
might represent a particular type and intensity of interaction (identified by the arc
label j) initiated by agent i towards agent i. For example, agent i might direct
great aﬀection toward agent i

as represented by arc j, but agent i

may direct only
lukewarm aﬀection toward agent i as represented by arc j

. Also, under our extended
definition nodes are allowed to be connected by multiple, distinct arcs. Thus, we
allow nodes to interact in multiple, distinct ways. For example, nodes i and i might
be connected by arcs j and j, with arc j running from node i to i and arc j running
in the opposite direction (i.e., from node i to node i).5 If node i represents a seller
and node i a buyer, then arc j might represent a contract oﬀer by the seller to
the buyer, while arc j

might represent the acceptance or rejection of that contract
oﬀer. Finally, under our extended definition loops are allowed and arcs are allowed
to be used multiple times in a given network.6 For example, arc j might be used
to connect nodes i and i as well as nodes i and i. Thus, under our definition
nodes i and i as well as nodes i and i are allowed to engage in the same type of
interaction as represented by arc j. Allowing each type of arc to be used multiple
times makes it possible to distinguish coalitions by the type of interaction taking place
between coalition members and to give a network representation of such coalitions.
For example, if the nodes in a given network represent agents, a j coalition would
consist of all agents i having a j connection with at least one other agent i

. Such
a j coalition would then have a network representation as the directed subnetwork
consisting of pairs of nodes, i and i

, connected by a j arc. Until now, most of
the economic literature on networks has focused on linking networks (see Jackson
(2001) for an excellent survey). By allowing arcs to possess direction and be used
multiple times and by allowing loops and nodes to be connected by multiple arcs,
our extended definition makes possible the application of networks to a richer set of
economic environments.
Given a particular directed network, an agent or a coalition of agents can change
the network to another network by simply adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs from
the existing network in accordance with certain rules represented via the supernet-
work.7 For example, suppose the nodes in a network represent agents and the rule
for adding an arc j from node i to node i requires that both agents i and i agree to
add arc j. Suppose also the rule for subtracting arc j from node i to node i requires
that only agent i or agent i agree to dissolve arc j. We refer to this particular set of
rules as Jackson-Wolinsky rules (see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)). Other rules are
5Under our extended definition, arc j might also run in the same direction as arc j. However,
our definition does not allow arc j to go from node i to node i multiple times.
6A loop is an arc going from a given node to that same node. For example, given arc j and node
i, the ordered pair (j, (i, i)) is a loop.
7Put diﬀerently, agents can change one network to another network by adding, subtracting, or
replacing ordered pairs, (j, (i, i)), in accordance with certain rules.
4
possible. For example, the addition of an arc might require that a simple majority
of the agents agree to the addition, while the removal an arc might require that a
two-thirds majority agree to the removal. Given the flexibility of the supernetwork
framework, any set rules governing network formation can be represented.
In order to relate our approach to network formation to the seminal work by
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we define a notion of pairwise stability for farsighted
network formation games over directed networks similar to the notion of pairwise
stability introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for myopic network formation
games over linking networks. We show that in any farsighted network formation game
induced by any rules of network formation, including the Jackson-Wolinsky (1996)
rules, the farsighted core is a subset of the set of pairwise stable networks.8 Thus,
nonemptiness of the farsighted core implies nonemptiness of the set of pairwise stable
networks and, given our result on the equivalence of nonemptiness of the farsighted
core and the existence of at least one strategic basin of attraction containing a single
network, the existence of a pairwise stable network is guaranteed by the existence
of at least one basin of attraction containing a single network. This result can be
viewed as an extension of a result due Jackson and Watts (2002) on the existence
of pairwise stable linking networks for myopic network formation games induced
by Jackson-Wolinsky rules (i.e., by Jackson-Wolinsky supernetworks). In particular,
Jackson andWatts (2002) consider myopic improving paths through the supernetwork
(our terminology) further assuming that moves from one network to another take
place one link at a time. They show that for any myopic network formation game
induced by such a supernetwork there exists a pairwise stable network if and only
if there does not exist a closed cycle of networks. Specializing to myopic network
formation games over linking networks induced by Jackson-Wolinsky supernetworks,
our notion of a strategic basin of attraction containing multiple networks corresponds
to their notion of a closed cycle of networks. Thus, stated in our terminology Jackson
and Watts show that for myopic Jackson-Wolinsky network formation games, there
exists a pairwise stable network if and only if there does not exist a strategic basin
of attraction containing multiple networks. In fact, following our approach, if we
specialize to myopic Jackson-Wolinsky network formation games (and strategic basins
of attraction generated by myopic improving paths), then we can conclude that the
existence of at least one strategic basin containing a single network is both necessary
and suﬃcient for the existence of a pairwise stable network.
We also define a notion of strong stability for farsighted network formation games
over directed networks similar to the strong stability notion of Jackson and van den
Nouweland (2001) for network formation games over linking networks. We show
that for any farsighted network formation game induced by any supernetwork, the
farsighted core is a subset of the set of strongly stable networks. Thus, nonemptiness
of the farsighted core implies nonemptiness of the set of strongly stable networks.
Finally, we show that in any farsighted network formation game, including those
8According to Jackson and Wolinsky, a network is pairwise stable if each pair of agents directly
connected by an arc in the network weakly prefer to remain directly connected, and if for each pair
of agents not directly connected, a direct connection preferred by one of the agents makes the other
agent strictly worse oﬀ (i.e., if one agent prefers to be directly connected, the other does not).
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induced by Jackson-Wolinsky supernetworks, each strategic basin of attraction has
a nonempty intersection with the largest consistent set of networks (i.e., the Chwe
set of networks, see Chwe (1994)).9 Given the way in which the farsighted core is
constructed from the basins of attraction, we conclude as an immediate corollary of
this result that the farsighted core is a subset of the largest consistent set of networks.
This corollary together with our result on the farsighted core and strong stability
imply that any network contained in the farsighted core is not only farsightedly
consistent but also strongly stable.
9Consistency with respect to farsighted dominance and the notion of a largest consistent set were
introduced by Chwe (1994) in an abstract game setting. We provide a detailed discussion of Chwe’s
notion in Section 5.3.
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2 Directed Networks
2.1 The Extended Definition
We begin by giving the formal definition of a directed network introduced in Page,
Wooders, and Kamat (2001). Let N be a finite set of nodes, with typical element
denoted by i, and let A be a finite set of arcs, with typical element denoted by j. Arcs
represent potential connections between nodes, and depending on the application,
nodes can represent economic agents or economic objects such as markets or firms.10
Definition 1 (Directed Networks)
Given node set N and arc set A, a directed network, G, is a nonempty subset of
A× (N ×N).
The collection of all directed networks given N and A is given by P (A×(N×N)),
where P (A×(N×N)) denotes the collection of all nonempty subsets of A×(N×N).
A directed networkG ∈ P (A×(N×N)) specifies how the nodes inN are connected
via the arcs in A. Note that in a directed network order matters. In particular, if
(j, (i, i

)) ∈ G, this means that arc j goes from node i to node i . Also, note that
under our definition of a directed network, loops are allowed - that is, we allow an
arc to go from a given node back to that given node. Finally, note that under our
definition an arc can be used multiple times in a given network and multiple arcs can
go from one node to another. However, our definition does not allow an arc j to go
from a node i to a node i multiple times.
The following notation is useful in describing networks. Given directed network
G ∈ P (A× (N ×N)), let
G(j) :=
q
(i, i

) ∈ N ×N : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
,
and
G(i) :=
q
j ∈ A : (j, (i, i)) ∈ G or (j, (i, i)) ∈ G
r
.



(1)
Thus,
G(j) is the set of node pairs connected by arc j in network G, and
G(i) is the set of arcs going from node i or coming to node i in network G.
Note that if for some arc j ∈ A, G(j) is empty, then arc j is not used in network
G.Moreover, if for some node i ∈ N , G(i) is empty then node i is not used in network
G, and node i is said to be isolated relative to network G.
10Of course in a supernetwork, nodes represent networks.
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Suppose that the node set N is given by N = {i1, i2, . . . , i5} , while the arc set A
is given by A = {j1, j2, . . . , j5, j6, j7} . Consider the network, G, depicted in Figure 1.
i
j 1
j 2
j3
j4
j 5
1
i 2
i3
i4 i5
j6
j 1
j 1
Figure 1: Network G
Note that in network G nodes i1 and i2 are connected by two j1 arcs running in oppo-
site directions and that nodes i1 and i3 are connected by two arcs, j1 and j3, running in
the same directions from node i3 to node i1. Thus, G(j1) = {(i1, i2), (i2, i1), (i3, i1)}
and G(j3) = {(i3, i1)}. Observe that (j6, (i4, i4)) ∈ G is a loop. Thus, G(j6) =
{(i4, i4)}. Also, observe that arc j7 is not used in network G. Thus, G(j7) = ∅.11
Finally, observe that G(i4) = {j4, j5, j6}, while G(i5) = ∅. Thus, node i5 is isolated
relative to G.12
2.2 Linking Networks and Directed Graphs
Our extended notion of a directed network can be formally related to the notion of
a linking network as follows. As before, let N denote a finite set of nodes. A linking
network, say g, consists of a finite collection of subsets of the form {i, i}, i 9= i.
For example, g might be given by g = {{i, i},{i, i}} for i, i, and i in N . Note
that in a linking network all connections or links are the same (i.e., connection types
are homogeneous), direction does not matter, and loops are ruled out by definition.
Letting gN denote the collection of all subsets ofN of size 2, the collection of all linking
networks given N is given by P (gN) where, recall, P (gN) denotes the collection of
all nonempty subsets of gN (e.g., see the definition in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)).
A directed graph, say E, consists of a finite collection of ordered pairs (i, i) ∈
N × N . For example, E might be given by E = {(i, i), (i, i)} for (i, i) and (i, i)
11The fact that arc j7 is not used in network G can also be denoted by writing
j7 /∈ projAG,
where projAG denotes the projection onto A of the subset
G ⊆ A× (N ×N)
representing the network.
12 If the loop (j7, (i5, i5)) were part of network G in Figure 1, then node i5 would no longer be
considered isolated under our definition. Moreover, we would have G(i5) = {j7}.
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in N ×N . Stated more compactly, a directed graph E is simply a subset of N ×N .
Thus, in any directed graph connection types are again homogeneous but direction
does matter and loops are allowed.
Under our definition, a directed network G is a subset of A× (N ×N), where as
before A is a finite set of arcs. Thus, in a directed network, say G ∈ P (A × (N ×
N)), connection types are allowed to be heterogeneous (distinguished by arc labels),
direction matters, and loops are allowed.
3 Supernetworks
3.1 The Definition of a Supernetwork
Let D denote a nonempty set of agents (or economic decision making units) with
typical element denoted by d, and let P (D) denote the collection of all coalitions
(i.e., nonempty subsets of D) with typical element denoted by S.
Given a feasible set of directed networksG ⊆ P (A×(N×N)), we shall assume that
each agent’s preferences over networks in G are specified via a real-valued network
payoﬀ function,
vd(·) : G→ R.
For each agent d ∈ D and each directed network G ∈ G, vd(G) is the payoﬀ to agent
d in network G. Agent d then prefers network G to network G if and only if
vd(G
) > vd(G).
Moreover, coalition S ∈ P (D) prefers network G to network G if and only if
vd(G
) > vd(G) for all d ∈ S.
Note that the payoﬀ function of an agent depends on the entire network. Thus, the
agent may be aﬀected by directed links between other agents even when he himself has
no direct or indirect connection with those agents. Intuitively, ‘widespread’ network
externalities are allowed.
By viewing each network G in a given collection of directed networks G ⊆ P (A×
(N ×N)) as a node in a larger network, we can give a precise network representation
of the rules governing network formation as well as agents’ preferences. To begin, let
M := {mS : S ∈ P (D)} denote the set of move arcs (or m-arcs for short),
P := {pS : S ∈ P (D)} denote the set of preference arcs (or p-arcs for short),
and
A :=M ∪ P.
Given networks G and G in G, we shall denote by (mS(G,G)) (i.e., by an m-arc,
belonging to coalition S, going from node G to node G) the fact that coalition
S ∈ P (D) can change network G to network G by adding, subtracting, or replacing
arcs in network G. Graphically, (mS , (G,G)) is represented by
G G’
S’m
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Moreover, we shall denote by (pS , (G,G)) (i.e., by a p-arc, belonging to coalition
S, going from node G to node G) the fact that each agent in coalition S ∈ P (D)
prefers network G to network G. Graphically, (pS , (G,G)) is represented by
G G’
S’p
Definition 2 (Supernetworks)
Given directed networks G ⊆ P (A×(N×N)), agent payoﬀ functions {vd(·) : d ∈ D} ,
and arc set A :=M ∪ P, a supernetwork, G, is a nonempty subset of A×(G×G)
such that for all networks G and G in G and for all coalition S ∈ P (D),
(mS , (G,G
)) ∈ G if and only if coalition S can change network G to network G,
G 9= G, by adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in network G,
and
(pS , (G,G
)) ∈ G if and only if vd(G) > vd(G) for all d ∈ S.
Thus, a supernetwork G specifies how the networks in G are connected via coali-
tional moves and coalitional preferences - and thus provides a network representation
of agent preferences and the rules governing network formation. Note that for all
coalitions S ∈ P (D) and networks G and G contained in G, if (pS , (G,G)) ∈ G,
then (pS , (G,G)) ∈ G for all subcoalitions S of S.
Under our definition of a supernetwork, multiplem-arcs, as well as multiple p-arcs,
connecting networks G and G in supernetwork G are allowed. However, multiple
m-arcs, or multiple p-arcs, from network G ∈ G to network G ∈ G belonging to
the same coalition are not allowed - and moreover, are unnecessary. Multiple m-
arcs (not belonging to the same coalition) connecting networks G and G in a given
supernetwork G indicate that in supernetwork G there is more than one coalition
capable of changing network G to network G. At the other extreme, if network
G ∈ G is such that no m-arcs or p-arcs go to or come from G, then network G cannot
be changed and is said to be isolated relative to supernetwork G.
Finally, it is important to note that in many economic applications, the set of
nodes, N , used in defining the networks in the collection G, and the set of economic
agents D are one and the same (i.e., in many applications N = D). However, under
our approach to network formation via supernetworks, it is not required that N = D.
3.2 The Farsighted Dominance Relation Induced by a Supernetwork
Given supernetwork G ⊂ A×(G×G), we say that network G ∈ G farsightedly
dominates network G ∈ G if there is a finite sequence of networks,
G0, G1, . . . ,Gh,
with G = G0, G = Gh, and Gk ∈ G for k = 0, 1, . . . , h, and a corresponding sequence
of coalitions,
S1, S2, . . . , Sh,
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such that for k = 1, 2, . . . , h
(mSk , (Gk−1, Gk)) ∈ G,
and
(pSk , (Gk−1, Gh)) ∈ G.
We shall denote by G ?? G the fact that network G ∈ G farsightedly dominates
network G ∈ G.
Figure 2 below provides a network representation of the farsighted dominance
relation in terms ofm-arcs and p-arcs. In Figure 2, networkG3 farsightedly dominates
network G0.
G3
G0 G1 G2
S1p
S1m S2m
S2p S3p S3m
Figure 2: G3farsightedly dominates G0
Note that what matters to the initially deviating coalition S1, as well as coalitions S2
and S3, is the ultimate network outcome G3. Thus, the initially deviating coalition
S1 will not be deterred even if
(pS1 , (G0, G1)) /∈ G
as long as the ultimate network outcome G3 is preferred to G0, that is, as long as G3
is such that
(pS1 , (G0,G3)) ∈ G.
Finally, we say that a network G ∈ G is farsightedly isolated relative to supernet-
work G, if there does not exist a network G ∈ G with G ?? G or G ?? G. Note
that if network G is isolated relative to G, then it is farsightedly isolated relative to
G.
3.3 The Farsighted Domination Path Relation Induced by a Super-
network
Given supernetworkG ⊂ A×(G×G), we say that a sequence of networks {Gk}k in G
is a farsighted domination path through supernetwork G (i.e., a ??-path through G)
if for any two consecutive networks Gk−1 and Gk, Gk farsightedly dominates Gk−1,
that is, if for any two consecutive networks Gk−1 and Gk,
Gk−1 ?? Gk.
We can think of the farsighted dominance relation Gk−1 ?? Gk between networks Gk
and Gk−1 as defining a ??-arc from network Gk−1 to network Gk. Given ??-path
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{Gh}h through G, the length of this path is defined to be the number of ??-arcs in
the path. We say that network G1 ∈ G is ??-reachable from network G0 ∈ G in G
if there exists a finite ??-path in G from G0 to G1 (i.e., a ??-path in G from G0 to
G1 of finite length). If network G0 ∈ G is ??-reachable from network G0 in G, then
we say that supernetwork G contains a ??-circuit. Thus, a ??-circuit in G starting
at network G0 ∈ G is a finite ??-path from G0 to G0. A ??-circuit of length 1 is
called a ??-loop. Note that because preferences are irreflexive, ??-loops are in fact
ruled out. However, because the farsighted dominance relation, ??, is not transitive,
it is possible to have ??-circuits of length greater than 1.
Given supernetwork G ⊂ A×(G×G), we can use the notion of ??-reachability
to define a new relation on the set of networks G. In particular, for any two networks
G0 and G1 in G define
G1 ?G G0 if and only if

G1 is ?? -reachable from G0 in supernetwork G , or
G1 = G0.
(2)
The relation ?G is a weak ordering on the set of networks G. In particular, ?G is
reflexive (G ?G G) and ?G is transitive (G2 ?G G1 and G1 ?G G0 implies that
G2 ?G G0). We shall refer to the relation ?G as the farsighted domination path
(FDP) relation induced by supernetwork G.13
4 Farsighted Network Formation Games
Given any collection of directed networks G ⊆ P (A×(N×N)) and any supernetwork
G ⊆ A×(G×G), where arc set A is the union of coalitional move arcs M and
coalitional preference arcs P, the corresponding farsighted network formation game
is given by the pair
(G,?G) ,
where ?G is the farsighted domination path (FDP) relation on G induced by super-
network G (see expression (2)).
4.1 Descendance Relations, Maximal Networks, and NetworksWith-
out Descendants
If G1 ?G G0 and G0 ?G G1, we say that networks G1 and G0 are equivalent and
we write G1 ≡G G0. If networks G1 and G0 are equivalent this means that either
networks G1 and G0 coincide or that G1 and G0 are on the same ??-circuit in
supernetwork G. If networks G1 and G0 are such that G1 ?G G0 but G1 and G0 are
not equivalent (i.e., but not G1 ≡G G0), we say that network G1 is a descendant of
network G0 and we write
G1 ?G G0. (3)
13The relation ?G is sometimes referred to as the transitive closure of the farsighted dominance
relation, ??.
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We say that a directed network G ∈ G is maximal in G if for any G ∈ G
G ?G G implies that G ≡G G,
that is, if G is maximal then G ?G G implies that G and G coincide or lie on the
same ??-circuit. Thus, given the definition of descendance, maximal networks are
precisely those networks without descendants. Letting
Γ?G(G) :=

G ∈ G : G ?G G ,
a network G ∈ G is without descendants or is maximal in the farsighted network
formation game (G,?G) if and only if
Γ?G(G) = ∅.
Note that any farsightedly isolated network is by definition a network without de-
scendants. Recall that a network G ∈ G is farsightedly isolated relative to G , if
there does not exist a network G ∈ G with G ?? G or G ?? G.
In attempting to identify those networks which are likely to emerge and persist if
agents are farsighted, networks without descendants are of particular interest. Here
is our main result concerning networks without descendants.
Theorem 1 (All farsighted network formation games have networks without descen-
dants)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. For every network G ∈ G
there exists a network G ∈ G such that
1. G ?G G, and
2. Γ?G(G) = ∅.
Proof. LetG0 be any network in G. If Γ?G(G0) = ∅, we are done. If not choose G1 ∈
Γ?G(G0). If Γ?G(G1) = ∅, we are done. If not, continue by choosing G2 ∈ Γ?G(G1).
Proceeding iteratively in this way, we can generate a sequence, G0,G1, G2, . . . . Now
observe that in a finite number of iterations we must come to a network Gk such
that Γ?G(Gk) = ∅. Otherwise, we could generate an infinite sequence, {Gk}k such
that for all k,
Gk ?G Gk−1.
However, because G is finite this sequence would contain at least one network, say
Gk , which is repeated an infinite number of times. Thus, all the networks in the
sequence lying between any two consecutive repetitions of Gk would be on the same
??-circuit in supernetworkG, contradicting the fact that for all k, Gk is a descendant
of Gk−1 (i.e., Gk ?G Gk−1).
By Theorem 1, in any farsighted network formation game (G,?G), corresponding
to any network G ∈ G there is a network G ∈ G without descendants which is ??-
reachable fromG. Thus, in any farsighted network formation game the set of networks
without descendants given by
Z := {G ∈ G : Γ?G(G) = ∅}
is nonempty.
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4.2 Basins of Attraction
Stated loosely, a basin of attraction is a set of equivalent networks to which the
strategic network formation process represented by the game might tend and from
which there is no escape. Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 3 (Basin of Attraction)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A set of networks A ⊆ G is
said to be a basin of attraction for (G,?G) if
1. the networks contained in A are equivalent (i.e., for all G and G in A, G ≡G
G), and
2. no network in A has descendants (i.e., there does not exist a network G ∈ G
such that G ?G A where G ?G A if and only if G ?G G for some G ∈ A).
As the following characterization result shows, there is a very close connection
between networks without descendants and basins of attraction.
Theorem 2 (A characterization of basins of attraction)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game and let A be a subset of
networks in G. The following statements are equivalent:
1. A is a basin of attraction for (G,?G).
2. There exists a network without descendants, G ∈ Z, such that
A =

G ∈ Z : G ≡G G

.
Proof. (1) implies (2): Because the sets A and {G ∈ Z : G ≡G G}, G ∈ Z, are
equivalence classes, A 9= {G ∈ Z : G ≡G G} implies that
A∩

G ∈ Z : G ≡G G

= ∅ for all G ∈ Z.
Thus, if (2) fails, this implies that A contains a network with descendants. Thus, A
cannot be a basin of attraction for (G,?G), and thus, (1) implies (2).14
(2) implies (1): Suppose now that
A =

G ∈ Z : G ≡G G

for some network G ∈ Z. If A is not a basin of attraction, then for some network
G ∈ G, G ?G G for some G ∈ A. But now G ?G G and G ≡G G imply that
G ?G G, contradicting the fact that G ∈ Z. Thus, (2) implies (1).
In light of Theorem 2, we conclude that in any farsighted network formation game
(G,?G), G contains a unique, finite, disjoint collection of basins of attraction, say
{A1,A2, . . . ,Am}, where for each k = 1, 2, . . . ,m (m ≥ 1)
Ak = AG : =

G ∈ Z : G ≡G G

14Note that if G ∈ Z and G ≡G G, then G ∈ Z.
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for some network G ∈ Z. Note that for networks G and G in Z such that G ≡G G,
AG = AG (i.e. the basins of attraction AG and AG coincide). Also, note that if
network G ∈ G is farsightedly isolated relative to G, then G ∈ Z and
AG : =

G ∈ Z : G ≡G G

= {G}
is, by definition, a basin of attraction - but a very uninteresting one.
Example 1 (The farsighted dominance relation and basins of attraction)
Figure 3 depicts the graph of the farsighted dominance relation induced by a su-
pernetwork G.
G0
G2
G4
G35
G1 G7
G8G2
Figure 3: Graph of the farsighted dominance relation induced by supernetwork G
In Figure 3, a network at the end of an arrow (a network by the arrowhead) farsight-
edly dominants the network at the beginning of the arrow. Thus, in Figure 3, network
G7 farsightedly dominants network G1 (i.e., G7 ?? G1). First, note that network
G0 is farsightedly isolated relative to the supernetwork. Second, note that the set of
networks without descendants is given by
Z = {G0, G2, G3, G4, G5, G8} .
Third, note that even though there are nine networks without descendants, because
networks G2,G3, G4, and G5 are equivalent, there are only three basins of attraction:
A1 = {G0} , A2 = {G2,G3, G4, G5} , and A3 = {G8} .
Because G2, G3, G4, and G5 are equivalent,
AG2 = AG3 = AG4 = AG5 = {G2,G3, G4, G5} .
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4.3 Farsighted Bases
In this subsection we show that the fact that all farsighted network formation games
possess a unique, finite, disjoint collection of basins of attraction implies that all
farsighted network formation games possess von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
with respect to the farsighted domination path relation, ?G. We refer to these ?G-
stable sets as farsighted bases and we refer to any network contained in a farsighted
basis as a farsightedly basic network. The formal definition of a farsighted basis is as
follows.
Definition 4 (Farsighted Basis)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A subset B of directed
networks in G is said to be a farsighted basis for (G,?G) if
(a) (internal ?G -stability) whenever G0 and G1 are in B, with G0 9= G1, then
neither G1 ?G G0 nor G0 ?G G1 hold, and
(b) (external ?G -stability) for any G0 /∈ B there exists G1 ∈ B
such that G1 ?G G0.
In other words, a nonempty subset of networks B is a farsighted basis for (G,?G)
if G0 and G1 are in B, with G0 9= G1, then G1 is not reachable from G0, nor is G0
reachable from G1, and if G0 /∈ B, then there exists G1 ∈ B reachable from G0.
We now have our main results on the existence, construction, and cardinality of
farsighted bases.15
Theorem 3 (Farsighted bases: existence, construction, and cardinality)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game, and without loss of generality
assume that (G,?G) has basins of attraction given by
{A1,A2, . . . ,Am} ,
where basin of attraction Ak contains |Ak| many networks (i.e., |Ak| is the cardinality
of Ak). Then the following statements are true:
1. B ⊆ G is a farsighted basis for (G,?G) if and only if B is constructed by choos-
ing one network from each basin of attraction, that is, if and only if B is of the
form
B = {G1, G2, . . . , Gm} ,
where Gk ∈ Ak for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. (G,?G) possesses
|A1| · |A2| · · · · · |Am| :=M
many farsighted bases and each basis, Bq, q = 1, 2, . . . ,M , has cardinality
|Bq| = |{A1,A2, . . . ,Am}| = m.
15These results can be viewed as extensions of some classical results from graph theory (e.g., see
Berge (2001), Chapter 2) to the theory of farsighted network formation games.
16
Proof. It suﬃces to prove (1). Given (1), the proof of (2) is straightforward. To
begin, let
B = {G1,G2, . . . ,Gm} ,
where Gk ∈ Ak for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and suppose that for Gk and Gk in B, Gk ?G Gk.
Since Gk ∈ Ak has no descendants, this would imply that Gk ≡G Gk. But this is a
contradiction because Gk ∈ Ak and Gk ∈ Ak and the basins of attraction Ak and
Ak are disjoint. Thus, B is internally ?G-stable. Now suppose that network G is not
contained in B. By Theorem 1, there exists a network G ∈ G such that G ?G G,
and Γ?G(G) = ∅ (i.e., G is a network without descendants). By Theorem 2, G is
contained in some basin of attraction Ak and therefore G ≡G Gk where Gk is the
kth component of {G1, G2, . . . ,Gm}. Thus, we have Gk ?G G ?G G implying that
Gk ?G G, and thus B is externally ?G-stable.
Suppose now that B ⊆ G is a farsighted basis for (G,?G). First note that each
network G in B is a network without descendants. Otherwise there exists G ∈ G\B
such that G ?G G. But then because B is externally ?G-stable, there exists G ∈ B,
G 9= G, such that G ?G G implying that G ?G G and contradicting the internal
?G-stability of B. Because each G ∈ B is without descendants, it follows from
Theorem 2 that each G ∈ B is contained in some basin of attraction Ak. Moreover,
because B is internally ?G-stable and because all networks contained in any one
basin of attraction are equivalent, no two distinct networks contained in B can be
contained in the same basin of attraction. It only remains to show that for each basin
of attraction, Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
B ∩ Ak 9= ∅.
Suppose not. Then for some k, B ∩Ak = ∅. Because all networks in Ak are without
descendants, for no network G ∈ Ak is it true that there exists a network G ∈ B
such that G ?G G. Thus, we have a contradiction of the external ?G-stability of
B.
Example 2 (Basins of attraction and farsighted bases)
Referring back to the graph of the farsighted dominance relation induced by su-
pernetwork G given in Figure 3, it follows from Theorem 3 that because
|A1| · |A2| · |A3| = 1 · 4 · 1 = 4,
the farsighted network formation game (G,?G) has 4 farsighted bases, each with
cardinality 3. By examining Figure 3 in light of Theorem 3, we see that the farsighted
bases for (G,?G) are given by
B1 = {G0, G2, G8} ,
B2 = {G0, G3, G8} ,
B3 = {G0, G4, G8} ,
B4 = {G0, G5, G8} .
17
4.4 The Farsighted Core
One of the most fundamental stability notions in game theory is the core. Here we
define the notion of core for farsighted network formation games. We call this notion
of the core the farsighted core.
Definition 5 (The Farsighted Core)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A subset C of directed
networks in G is said to be the farsighted core of (G,?G) if for each network G ∈ C
there does not exist a network G ∈ G, G 9= G, such that G ?G G.
Our next results give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the core of a farsighted
network formation game to be nonempty, as well as a recipe for constructing the
farsighted core.
Theorem 4 (Farsighted core: nonemptiness, construction, and cardinality)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game, and without loss of generality
assume that (G,?G) has basins of attraction given by
{A1,A2, . . . ,Am} ,
where basin of attraction Ak contains |Ak| many networks (i.e., |Ak| is the cardinality
of Ak). Then the following statements are true:
1. (G,?G) has a nonempty farsighted core if and only if there exists a basin of
attraction containing a single network, that is, if and only if for some basin of
attraction Ak, |Ak| = 1.
2. Suppose there exist basins of attraction with cardinality 1, and let
{Ak1 ,Ak2 , . . . ,Akn} ⊆ {A1,A2, . . . ,Am} ,
where Ak ∈ {Ak1 ,Ak2 , . . . ,Akn} if and only if |Ak| = 1, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
C ⊆ G, C 9= ∅, is the farsighted core of (G,?G) if and only if C is given by
C = {Gk1 , Gk2 , . . . , Gkn} ,
where Gki ∈ Aki, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Moreover, if C 9= ∅ is the farsighted core
of (G,?G), then C has cardinality
|C| = |{Ak1 ,Ak2 , . . . ,Akn}| = n.
Proof. It suﬃces to show that a network G is contained in the farsighted core C if
and only if G ∈ Ak for some basin of attraction Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, with |Ak| = 1.
First note that if G is in the farsighted core, then G is a network without descendants.
Thus, G ∈ Ak for some basin of attraction Ak. If |Ak| > 1, then there exists another
network G ∈ Ak such that G ≡G G. Thus, G ?G G contradicting the fact that G
is in the farsighted core. Conversely, if G ∈ Ak for some basin of attraction Ak with
|Ak| = 1, then there does not exist a network G 9= G such that G ?G G.
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Example 3 (Basins of attraction and the farsighted core)
Referring back to the graph of the farsighted dominance relation induced by su-
pernetwork G given in Figure 3, it follows from Theorem 4 that
C = {G0, G8} ,
is the farsighted core of the network formation game (G,?G). Consider the graph
of the farsighted dominance relation induced by a diﬀerent supernetwork G given in
Figure 4.
G2
G4
G35
G1
G2
Figure 4: Graph of the farsighted dominance relation induced by supernetwork G
Here there is only one basin of attraction,
A = {G2, G3,G4, G5} ,
and because |A| > 1, the farsighted core of the network formation game (G,?G) is
empty.
5 Other Stability Notions for Network Formation Games
5.1 Strongly Stable Networks
In this subsection we extend the Jackson-van den Nouweland (2000) notion of strong
stability to farsighted network formation games over directed networks induced by
arbitrary supernetworks. We show that if the farsighted core is nonempty then the
set of strongly stable networks is nonempty and contains the farsighted core. It then
follows from Theorem 4 that the existence of a basin of attraction containing a single
network implies nonemptiness of the set of strongly stable networks.
We begin with a formal definition of strong stability in farsighted network forma-
tion games.
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Definition 6 (Strong stability)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A network G ∈ G is said to
be strongly stable in (G,?G), if (mS, (G,G)) ∈ G for some coalition S and network
G ∈ G, implies that (pS, (G,G

)) /∈ G. We shall denote by SS the set of strongly
stable networks in (G,?G).
We now have our main result on the farsighted core and strong stability.
Theorem 5 (The Farsighted Core and Strong Stability)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game induced by any supernetwork
G. If the farsighted core, C, of (G,?G) is nonempty, then SS is nonempty and
C ⊆ SS.
Proof. Let C ⊆ G, C 9= ∅, be the farsighted core of (G,?G) and let network G be
contained in C. Then {G} is a basin of attraction. Thus, there does not exist a
network G ∈ G, G 9= G, such that G ?G G. If for some coalition S and some
network G ∈ G, (mS, (G,G

)) ∈ G, then it must be true that (pS, (G,G

)) /∈ G,
otherwise, we would have G ?G G, a contradiction. Thus, G ∈ SS.
5.2 Pairwise Stable Networks
In this subsection, we assume that the set of nodes N and the set of agents D are
one and the same (i.e., N = D) and we extend the Jackson-Wolinsky (1996) notion
of pairwise stability to farsighted network formation games over directed networks
induced by arbitrary supernetworks (including Jackson-Wolinsky supernetworks in
which arc addition is bilateral and arc subtraction is unilateral). We then show
that if the farsighted core is nonempty, then the set of pairwise stable networks is
nonempty and contains the farsighted core. It then follows from Theorem 4 that the
existence of a basin of attraction containing a single network implies nonemptiness
of the set of pairwise stable networks.
Definition 7 (Pairwise stability)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A network G ∈ G is said
to be pairwise stable in (G,?G), if
1. (m{i,i}, (G,G ∪ (j, (i, i)) ∈ G for some agents i and i in N = D and some
arc j ∈ A, implies that (p{i,i}, (G,G ∪ (j, (i, i)) /∈ G (i.e., implies that either
vi(G ∪ (j, (i, i)) ≤ vi(G) or that vi(G ∪ (j, (i, i)) ≤ vi(G));
2. (a) (m{i}, (G,G?(j, (i, i)) ∈ G for some agent i in N = D and some arc j ∈ A,
implies that (p{i}, (G,G?(j, (i, i)) /∈ G (i.e., implies that vi(G?(j, (i, i)) ≤
vi(G)), and
(b) (m{i}, (G,G?(j, (i, i)) ∈ G for some agent i in N = D and some arc j ∈
A, implies that (p{i}, (G,G?(j, (i, i)) /∈ G (i.e., implies that vi(G?(j, (i, i)) ≤
vi(G)).
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Let PS denote the set of pairwise stable networks in (G,?G), where (G,?G) is
a farsighted network formation game with N = D (i.e., nodes = agents) induced by
an arbitrary supernetwork G. It follows from the definitions of strong stability and
pairwise stability that
SS ⊆ PS.
Moreover, if G is a Jackson-Wolinsky supernetwork, then SS = PS. Also, under our
definition of pairwise stability a network G ∈ G that cannot be changed to another
network by any coalition (including a coalition consisting of one or two agents) in
supernetwork G is pairwise stable. Stately formally, a network G ∈ G such that
(mS , (G,G

)) /∈ G for all coalitions S and all networks G ∈ G,
is pairwise stable in (G,?G).
We now have our main result on the farsighted core and pairwise stability. The
proof of this result is similar to the proof of Theorem 5 above.
Theorem 6 (The Farsighted Core and Pairwise Stability)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game with N = D induced by an
arbitrary supernetwork G. If the farsighted core, C, of (G,?G) is nonempty, then
PS is nonempty and
C ⊆ PS.
5.3 Farsightedly Consistent Networks
In this subsection, we show that in any farsighted network formation game induced by
an arbitrary supernetwork, each basin of attraction has a nonempty intersection with
the largest consistent set (i.e., the Chwe set - see Chwe (1994)). This fact implies that
if the farsighted network formation game has a nonempty farsighted core, then it is
contained in the largest consistent set. In Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001), Chwe’s
notions of farsighted consistency and largest consistent set are extended supernet-
works and it is shown that any farsighted network formation game has a nonempty,
largest consistent set. In light of Theorem 6 above, we can conclude therefore that
any network contained in the farsighted core (i.e., in a basin of attraction containing
a single network) is not only farsightedly consistent but also strongly stable.
We begin with a formal definition of farsighted consistency.
Definition 8 (Farsightedly Consistent Sets)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game. A subset F of directed
networks in G is said to be farsightedly consistent in (G,?G) if
for all G0 ∈ F,
(mS1 , (G0,G1)) ∈ G for some G1 ∈ G and some coalition S1, implies that
there exists G2 ∈ F
with G2 = G1 or G2 ?? G1 such that,
(pS1 , (G0,G2)) /∈ G.
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In words, a subset of directed networks F is said to be farsightedly consistent in
(G,?G) if given any network G0 ∈ F and any mS1-deviation to network G1 ∈ G by
coalition S1 (via adding, subtracting, or replacing arcs in accordance with G), there
exists further deviations leading to some network G2 ∈ F where the initially deviating
coalition S1 is not better oﬀ - and possibly worse oﬀ. A network G ∈ G is said to be
farsightedly consistent if G ∈ F where F is a farsightedly consistent set in (G,?G).
There can be many farsightedly consistent sets in (G,?G). We shall denote by F∗ is
largest farsightedly consistent set (or simply, the largest consistent set). Thus, if F is
a farsightedly consistent set, then F ⊆ F∗.
Two questions arise in connection with the largest consistent set: (i) does there
exist a largest consistent set of networks in (G,?G), and (ii) is it nonempty? As shown
in Page, Wooders, and Kamat (2001) existence follows from Proposition 1 in Chwe
(1994), while nonemptiness (and also external stability) follow from the Corollary
to Proposition 2 in Chwe (1994). We now have our main result on the relationship
between basins of attraction, the farsighted core, and the largest consistent set for
farsighted network formation games induced by arbitrary supernetworks.
Theorem 7 (Basins of Attraction, the Farsighted Core, and the Largest Consistent
Set)
Let (G,?G) be a farsighted network formation game, and without loss of generality
assume that (G,?G) has nonempty largest consistent set given by F∗ and basins of
attraction given by
{A1,A2, . . . ,Am} .
Then the following statements are true:
1. Each basin of attraction Ak, k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, has a nonempty intersection with
the largest consistent set F∗, that is
F∗ ∩Ak 9= ∅, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. If (G,?G) has a nonempty farsighted core C, then
C ⊆ F∗.
Proof. In light of Theorem 4, (2) easily follows from (1). Thus, it suﬃces to prove
(1). Suppose that for some basin of attraction Ak
F∗ ∩Ak = ∅.
Let G be a network in Ak . Because F∗ is externally stable with respect to the
farsighted dominance relation ??, G /∈ F∗ implies that there exists some network
G∗ ∈ F∗ such that G∗ ?? G. Thus, G∗ ?G G. Because the networks in Ak are
without descendants, it must be true that G ?G G∗. But this implies thatG∗ ≡G G,
and therefore that G∗ ∈ Ak , a contradiction.
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6 Competitive Contracting Networks
In this section we introduce the notion of a competitive contracting network via a
relatively simple example. The sort of nodes in the network we have in mind are,
for example, L.L. Bean and Land’s End, or competitors oﬀering mutual funds or in-
surance contracts and also potential customers of the competing firms. In principle,
there may be many firms (nodes) oﬀering catalogs of products to potential consumers
or ‘the market’ (also nodes). For this application, since arcs represent contracts, it is
essential that arcs be allowed to be labelled and be heterogeneous.16 We consider an
example in which two firms compete for the services of a single, privately informed
agent via catalogs of contracts. Our objective is to identify those competitive con-
tracting strategies (i.e., catalog strategies) that are likely to emerge and persist if
firms behave farsightedly in choosing their catalogs.
6.1 Contracts and Catalogs
To begin, suppose that there are only two contracts, fA and fB, and that each firm,
F1 and F2, can oﬀer the agent, M , a catalog of contracts from the following set of
catalogs:
{{0} , {fA} , {fB} , {fA, fB}} .
Here, contract 0 denotes no contracting. Thus, if firm 1 oﬀers the agent catalog {0},
while firm 2 oﬀers the agent catalog {fA, fB} , then firm 1 has chosen not to enter the
competition - or put diﬀerently, has chosen not to enter the industry. In this case,
the catalog profile oﬀered by firms is given by
({0} , {fA, fB}) .
Given the catalog profile oﬀered by firms, the privately informed agent then chooses
a firm with which to contract and a particular contract from the catalog oﬀered by
that firm (i.e., the agent can contract with one and only one firm). In order to take
into account the possibility that the agent may wish to abstain from contracting
altogether, we assume that there is a fictitious firm i = 0 that oﬀers the catalog {0}.
Thus, if firms 1 and 2 oﬀer catalog profile ({fA} , {fA, fB}) , then the full catalog
profile is given by 
{0}
firm 0
, {fA}
firm 1
, {fA, fB}
firm 2

,
and the agent’s mutually exclusive choices can be summarized as follows:
contract with firm 0 and choose from catalog {0},
contract with firm 1and choose from catalog {fA} ,
contract with firm 2 and choose from catalog {fA, fB} .
The timing in the contracting game is as follows: First, each firm simultaneously
and confidentially chooses and commits to a particular catalog oﬀer. Next, the agent
16To the best of our knowledge, prior models of networks in the economics and game theoretic
literature do not permit such an application.
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chooses a firm and a contract from that firm’s catalog. Ex ante each firm knows the
agent up to a distribution of agent types, and therefore, given any catalog profile
oﬀered by the firms, each firm is able to deduce the agent’s type-dependent best
responses and compute the firm’s expected payoﬀ.
6.2 Catalog Strategies and Contracting Networks
Each profile of catalog strategies by firms can be uniquely represented by a contracting
network. Let the set of nodes be given by N = {F1, F2,M}, the set of arcs by
A = {{0} , {fA} , {fB} , {fA, fB}}, and the set of agents participating in the network
formation game by D = {F1, F2}.
Figure 5 depicts the contracting network G corresponding to a particular profile
of catalog oﬀers by the firms.
F2
F1
M
{fA,fB}
{fA}
Figure 5: A Competitive Contracting Network
In Figure 5, the arc labeled {fA, fB} going from node F1 to nodeM indicates that in
network G firm 1 is oﬀers catalog {fA, fB} to the agent, while the arc labeled {fA}
going from node F2 to node M indicates that firm 2 oﬀers catalog {fA}.
6.3 The Competitive Contracting Supernetwork
6.3.1 Network Payoﬀs
For the competitive contracting game, the feasible set of contracting networks G
consists of 16 networks. Table 1 summarizes the expected payoﬀs to the firms in each
possible contracting network.
←− Firm 2 −→
↑
Firm 1
↓
{0} {fA} {fB} {fA, fB}
{0} (0,0)1 (0,-2)2 (0,5)3 (0,3)4
{fA} (3,0)5 (1,-3)6 (1,3)7 (1,1)8
{fB} (0,0)9 (-1,-2)10 (0,3)11 (-2,3)12
{fA, fB} (2,0)13 (1,-3)14 (0,1)15 (-1,1)16
Table 1: Contracting Network Payoﬀs
For example, the contracting network depicted in Figure 5, call it network G14,
generates the payoﬀs in cell 14 of the payoﬀ matrix. Thus, the expected payoﬀs to
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firm 1 (F1) and firm 2 (F2) in network G14 are given by
vF1(G) := Π1({fA, fB} , {fA}) = 1,
and
vF2(G) := Π2({fA, fB} , {fA}) = −3.
This means that if firm 1 oﬀers the agent catalog {fA, fB} while firm 2 oﬀers catalog
{fA}, then firm 1’s expected payoﬀ is 1, while firm 2’s expected payoﬀ is −3.17
6.3.2 Network Formation Rules
We shall assume that rules of network formation corresponding to the contracting
game are purely unilateral. Thus, for example, firm 1 can alter the status quo con-
tracting network by unilaterally replacing the arc from F1 to M representing the
firm’s current catalog oﬀer by another arc representing a diﬀerent catalog oﬀer. Fig-
ure 6 below depicts them-arc, as well as the p-arc, connections between networks G14
and G7 (corresponding to cells 14 and 7 in Table 1) in the competitive contracting
supernetwork.
F2
F1
M
{fA,fB}
{fA} F2
F1
M
{fA}
{fB}{F1, F2}
m
{F2}
p
G14 G7
Figure 6: The Connections Between G14and G7in the
Competitive Contracting Supernetwork
Note that firms 1 and 2 can change network G14 to network G7 - as well as change
network G7 back to network G14 (hence the two-headed m-arc, m{F1,F2}, connecting
networks G14 and G7).18 In moving from G14 to G7, firm 1 unilaterally replaces arc
{fA, fB} from F1 toM with arc {fA} from F1 toM , while firm 2 unilaterally replaces
arc {fA} from F2 to M with arc {fB} from F2 to M . Thus, moving from G14 to G7
requires that firms 1 and 2 act unilaterally and simultaneously.19 Referring to Table
1, note that firm 2 prefers G7 to G14 because
vF2(G7) := Π2({fA} , {fB}) = 3,
and
vF2(G14) := Π2({fA, fB} , {fA}) = −3,
17Here, we have spared the reader the tedious details of computing the expected payoﬀs appearing
in Table 1.
18Thus, the competitive contracting supernetwork is said to be symmetric.
19 It is important to note that the rules of network formation, even though they are unilateral, do
not rule out the possibility that firms act cooperatively.
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while firm 1 is indiﬀerent to networks G7 and G14 because
vF1(G7) := Π2({fA} , {fB}) = 1,
and
vF1(G14) := Π2({fA, fB} , {fA}) = 1.
Hence, given the definition of p-arcs, in Figure 6 there is a p-arc, p{F2}, from G14 to
G7, but there is no p-arc, p{F1}, from G14 to G7 or from G7 to G14.
6.4 The Farsighted Core of the Competitive Contracting Game
Given the simplicity of the network formation rules, we conclude by inspection of
Table 1 that the farsighted network formation game over contracting networks has one
strategic basin of attraction consisting of a single network, G7. Thus, the farsighted
core of the network formation game over contracting networks is given by
C = {G7} ,
and thus the catalog profile
({fA}, {fB})
corresponding to contracting networkG7 is likely to emerge and persist if firms behave
farsightedly in choosing their catalogs. Note that network G7 is also strongly stable
and farsightedly consistent. In fact, network G7 is the only strongly stable network
as well as the only farsightedly consistent network. Thus in this example.
C = SS = F∗ = {G7} .
6.5 A Variation on the Example
Suppose now that we change the example by changing the payoﬀs. Table 2 summaries
the new payoﬀs.
←− Firm 2 −→
↑
Firm 1
↓
{0} {fA} {fB} {fA, fB}
{0} (0,0)1 (0,-2)2 (0,5)3 (0,1)4
{fA} (3,0)5 (1,-3)6 (1,1)7 (1,-1)8
{fB} (0,0)9 (-1,-2)10 (0,1)11 (-2,1)12
{fA, fB} (2,0)13 (1,-3)14 (0,-1)15 (-1,-1)16
Table 2: The New Contracting Network Payoﬀs
By a careful inspection of Table 2 we conclude that in our new farsighted network
formation game there is again only one strategic basin of attraction - but this time
consisting of multiple networks. In particular, this single basin of attraction is given
by
A = {G5, G7, G13} .
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Thus, in our new farsighted network formation game the farsighted core is empty.
Despite this, we can conclude that the catalog profiles corresponding to the networks
contained in A are those that are likely to emerge and persist if firms behave far-
sightedly in choosing their catalogs. In particular, each network in A constitutes a
farsighted basis of the network formation game (with respect to the farsighted dom-
ination path relation induced by the contracting supernetwork G). Thus, in the
competitive contracting game the set catalog profiles corresponding to the farsight-
edly basic networks, G5,G7,and G13, listed in Table 3, is likely to emerge and persist
if firms behave farsightedly in choosing their catalog strategies.
G5
({fA}, {0})
G7
({fA}, {fB})
G13
({fA, fB}, {0})
Table 3: The Farsightedly Basic Networks and Their Corresponding Catalog Profiles
We close by noting that network G7 is the only strongly stable network and that
networks G7 and G13 are the only farsightedly consistent networks. Thus, in our new
example SS = {G7} and F∗ = {G7, G13}.20
7 Further research
While we have related and characterized a number of solution concepts for our new
model of networks and network formation, a number of questions remain. For exam-
ple, is there an analogue of ‘balancedness,’ ensuring nonemptiness of the farsighted
core of a game?21 Is there an analogue of the ‘partnered core’22 for networks? Are
there any conditions on ‘admissible’ networks which ensure that the farsighted core
is nonempty independently of the structure of payoﬀs?23 Current research is directed
towards investigating these issues.
We close by noting that a number of other economic situations might provide
interesting possibilities for analysis as abstract networks as developed in this paper.
We have in mind, for example, problems from industrial organization, such as cartel
formation, the formation of networks of collaboration, and trade networks. See, for
example, Casella and Rauch (2001) and Bloch (2001) or other articles in the same
volume for further potential applications.
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